Ramzi Baroud for Al-Ahram
A reductionist discourse is one that selectively tailors its reading of subject matters in such a way as to only yield desired outcomes, leaving little or no room for other inquiries, no matter how appropriate or relevant. The so-called “Arab Spring”, although now far removed from its initial meanings and aspirations, has become just that: a breeding ground for choosy narratives solely aimed at advancing political agendas that are deeply entrenched with regional and international involvement.
When a despairing Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, lit himself
on fire on 17 December 2010, he ignited more than a mere revolution in
his country. His excruciating death gave birth to a notion that the
psychological expanses between despair and hope, death and rebirth and
between submissiveness and revolution are ultimately connected. His act,
regardless of what adjective one may use to describe it, was the key
that Tunisians used to unlock their ample reserve of collective power.
President Zein Al-Abidine bin Ali’s decision to step down on 14 January
2011, was in a sense a rational assessment on his part if one is to
consider the impossibility of confronting a nation that had in its grasp
a true popular revolution.
Egypt also revolted less than two weeks later. And it was then that
Tunisia’s near-ideal revolutionary model became prey for numerous, often
selective readings and ultimately for utter exploitation. The Egyptian
January 25 Revolution was the first Arab link between Tunisia and the
upheavals that travelled throughout Arab nations. Some were quick to
ascribe the phenomenon with all sorts of historical, ideological and
even religious factors thereby making links whenever convenient and
overlooking others, however apt. The Al-Jazeera Arabic website still has
a map of all Arab countries, with ones experiencing revolutionary
influx marked in red.
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