On June 7, 1967, Israeli forces move through the Sinai as they press the attack on Egyptian troops. (Associated Press / June 8, 2012)
"The 1967 Israeli war was one of choice and conquest and not one of defense against an existential threat. The myth of the existential threat notwithstanding, Israel Defense Forces generals saw an opportunity to assert Israeli might against an ill-prepared Egyptian army, and as the generals anticipated, the destruction of the Egyptian forces was swift and relatively easy. This allowed them to then "finish the job" and take the West Bank and the Golan Heights, two regions that Israel had coveted for many years.
Even Menachem Begin, who was a member of the 1967 Cabinet and later prime minister, asserted: "Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches did not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him."
The IDF knowingly decided to perpetuate the notion of an existential threat. This scare tactic was helpful in applying public pressure against a hesitant government reluctant to give the green light for a preemptive strike against Egypt."
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