Due to the Agranat Report, the impression that the main failure of the 1973 war was an intelligence failure took hold; documents released last week prove that this is not so.
Moshe Dayan and Golda Meir in the Golan Heights, during the Yom
Kippur War. Photo by Reuters
Kippur War. Photo by Reuters
Haaretz
Due to the Agranat Report, the impression that the main failure of the
1973 war was an intelligence failure took hold. The studies and the
transcripts of the testimonies to the Agranat Commission released last
week prove that this is not so. The biggest failure was that of the
political leaders.
Golda, Dayan and their partners did not want peace with Egypt, at the
price later paid by Menachem Begin. Nor did they share with the
intelligence analysts the secrets that would have changed the assessment
and heightened the alert level. Golda and Dayan, not Elazar and Zeira,
deserve to be remembered as the ones responsible for the toll the war
took.
Due to the Agranat Report, the impression that the main failure of the
1973 war was an intelligence failure took hold. The studies and the
transcripts of the testimonies to the Agranat Commission released last
week prove that this is not so. The biggest failure was that of the
political leaders.
Golda, Dayan and their partners did not want peace with Egypt, at the
price later paid by Menachem Begin. Nor did they share with the
intelligence analysts the secrets that would have changed the assessment
and heightened the alert level. Golda and Dayan, not Elazar and Zeira,
deserve to be remembered as the ones responsible for the toll the war
took.
No comments:
Post a Comment